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REPLY TO SUMMARY STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because Plaintiff has not rebutted seventy-six of the 
eighty cases that were cited by Defendant it is very difficult to 
argue the Law and the facts if they are not rebutted. It is 
obvious that the Plaintiff chose to either ignore the authorities 
or could not find cases in point to substantiate their position. 
Further, Plaintiff erroneously states that RTEM was "established 
under the supervision of Shillington". RTEM was a new franchise, 
but was a separately incorporated entity independently operating 
(Respondent's Brief, p.3, para. 4). 
Mr. Shillington continually denied being personally 
responsible for any goods (para. 12, p. 2, Shillington Affidavit 
dated September 18, 1987, Addendum No. 3 to Appellant's Brief). 
Plaintiff mistakes the record as "facts" when he says 
that Plaintiff approved credit only after Defendant agreed to be 
personally responsible. In fact Mr. Yoho did not see the 
guaranty until his deposition (p. 14, 1. 1-2, Yoho Deposition, 
Addendum No. 9 to Appellant's Brief). In fact the approval space 
in the agreement was left blank (p. 14, 1. 12-14, Yoho 
Deposition). Plaintiff asserts a reliance theory and states at 
page 4 of his brief, "Based upon the strength of that application 
. . . Plaintiff provided goods . . .", when in fact the 
Plaintiff's own testimony was that shipment was made in April 
1984 some four months prior to the credit application being 
signed by Mr. Shillington. Further, Vern Yoho thought the appli-
cation was signed by Mr. Shillington prior to the shipment of 
goods (Yoho Depo, p. 14, 1. 17-24), when in fact it was four 
months later (Lancaster Depo, p. 1, para. 4 & 6). 
Plaintiff also glosses over the protest and denial of 
Mr. Shillington wherein he stated he didn't understand what he 
was signing in response to heavy examination by Plaintiff's coun-
sel (Shillington Depo, p. 35, 1. 3-9). Mr. Shillington also 
denied he knew what he was signing (Lancaster Affiavit, p. 2, 
para. 8, and Shillington Affidavit, p. 2, para. 7, 8 & 12, 
Addendum No. 3). If anything, this created a major issue of fact 
which should be submitted to a full trial for testimony. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Plaintiff states, and in a rather cavalier manner, 
and what appears to be without a complete review of the record 
(and with his emphasis added), that, 
"Most importantly, the Defendant has never, by 
any sworn statement, stated he did not 
understand that he was signing a personal 
guaranty of RTEM's obligation." 
The record is replete with testimony from many parties 
that Moe Shillington signed under protest and did not know what 
he was signing and didn't personally deal with or guaranty 
RTEM's obligation, but most fatal is that Plaintiff merely had 
to go to Defendant's brief and a quick perusal of Addendum No. 3 
thereto at page 2, paras. 8 & 12 of Mr. Shillington1s Affidavit, 
and he would have discovered the following language in a sworn 
statement: 
"12. I never agreed to be personally liable 
for 'any liability' incurred by RTEM, Inc., 
nor did I intend to guarantee the debts of 
RTEM, Inc." 
-2-
"8. . . . I did not read it. I did not 
understand what it contained nor did I intend 
on signing a guaranty instrument. I signed 
it in protest . . .". 
It is obvious that Plaintiff chose to ignore the language, just 
like he chose to ignore the delivery date. The ambiguities did 
exist because of oversite and error by his company. 
It is true that the Supreme Court will not overturn .if 
there is amble evidence to support the ruling below. In the 
case at bar, not only was there, respectfully, an abuse of judi-
cial discretion but also a ruling in contradiction to the 
disputed evidence. This runs squarely against the case authori-
ties and more specifically, Nevada State Bank v. Snowden, 449 
P.2d 254 (Nev. 1959) • 
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
In Buehner Block Company v. U.W.C. Assoc, 752 P.2d 892 
(1988), erroneously cited by Plaintiffs as Vol. 792 and is 
distinguished on its facts. The Court there, held that language 
in a commitment letter imposed no obligation on a lender to 
require bonding. There, it was an interpretation of language 
already in the contract, not as here, omitted language creating 
uncertainty. Also, there was no "duty" language as implied by 
Plaintiff. Plaintiff then cites Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch v. 
Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d 1357 (Ut. App. 1987) which does not 
exactly stand for the language cited. This was a declaratory 
judgment case and Plaintiff assumes the very fact in issue in 
the case which was to be decided by the Court, i.e., that the 
document is not ambiguous. The Court said in Big Cottonwood 
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document is not ambiguous. The Court said in Big Cottonwood 
Tanner Ditch v. Salt Lake City, Id., "Where the language is 
ambiguous it is the duty of the Court to enforce the agreement 
(emphasis added)". In our case the credit application was ambi-
guous and as a result of Plaintiff's own fault. Futher the 
Court emphasised that the contract should be looked at if it 
". . .is possible." We agree with that Hornbook Law. However, 
you cannot interpret intent and use construction rules where 
essential terms are omitted. There isn't even a date in the 
document. Plaintiff agrues Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 6 36 P. 
2d 1060 (Ut. 1981) and Big Butte Ranch, Inc. v. Holm, 670 P.2d 
690 (Ut. 1977). In Utah Valley, Id., there are unrelated facts. 
There the Court held that the trial judge erred in allowing 
extrinsic evidence as to the motivation of a co-signer. There 
was no ambiguity issue, no omitted terms, as here, and no 
challenge as to intent of the signer as in our case. 
The Big Butte case, Id., states correct law in that 
intent may be shown from the contract, however, it goes further 
in the well reasoned opinion to state, " . . . and if the meaning 
is ambiguous or uncertain and consider parole evidence of the 
parties intentions." It states as a rule to allow parole evi-
dence to assist in determining intent which is the gravaman of 
this case. Mr. Shillington was denied his opportunity to show 
what his intentions were. Ms. Lancaster, the Yoho employee, 
should have been allowed to be called as a witness to verify 
Mr. Shillington's state of mind. 
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Again, Plaintiff asserts at page 10, para. 2 of his 
brief that Defendant never, under oath, stated he did not 
understand the paper or didn't guarantee. This has been 
repeatedly controverted and is the basis for allowing Defendant 
to have his day in court. (See Shillington Deposition, 
Addendum No. 8, p. 34, 1. 1-9; p. 35, 1. 3-5. Also, Lancaster 
Affidavit, Addendum No. 4, p. 2, para. 8. Shillington1s Affi-
davit, Addendum No. 3, p. 2, paras. 7, 8, & 12). Plaintiff 
misstates the evidence in his first paragraph on page 11 of his 
brief. He states, ". . .Mr. Yoho testified that he allowed 
goods to be sent to RTEM only after receiving the promise of 
Mr. Shillington to be personally responsible . . . " Yet Vern 
Yoho in his deposition (Addendum No. 9, at p. 14, 1. 2-3), 
stated he thought the day of the deposition was the first he 
saw the credit application. Which side of the confused and 
contradictory argument do we believe? The only credible evi-
dence before the Court was that Vern Yoho hadn't seen the docu-
ment and therefore could not have sent goods, " . . . only after 
receiving (emphasis added). . .", the alleged promise of Moe 
Shillington. There is no other assertion anywhere that your 
undersigned counsel can recall wherein the Plaintiff's even hint 
that Defendant agreed to be personally liable and we challange 
the Plaintiff to come forth with that tangible evidence! 
Vern Yoho actually testified that the document was 
signed (and he erroneously assumed prior to delivery) in April 
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19 84 (p.14, Yoho Deposition), when in fact it wasn't signed 
until August 1984 which was many months after the initial deli-
very of goods. Plaintiff cites at page 11 of his brief the case 
Ranier National Bank v. Lewis, Wash. App. 419, 635 P.2d 153 
(1981). This case is strongly distinguished on its facts and 
also it is secondary authority. There Mrs. Lewis signed a 
guarantee on the date the bank extended the loan. Mr. Lewis 
signed subsequently. However, and not like our case, Mr. Lewis 
sent a letter of confirmation. The bank also confirmed by 
letter. Mr. Lewis also telephone the Bank Manager confirming 
the guarantee. None of these additonal corroborating factors 
exist in the Yoho/Shillington case. Here, Defendant has always 
disputed his lack of an understanding of the facts and the docu-
ment itself. In fact, the Ranier case, Id., said there was no 
fact showing Mr. Lewis ever denied knowledge of the guaranty. 
In our case the affidavits and depositions all corroborate Mr. 
Shillington1s testimony of lack of understanding and no intent 
to guarantee. 
The Plaintiff at page 12 asserts that credit was 
extended solely on the promise of Mr. Shillington's promise. 
However, there is no citation or reference to any such promise. 
When was such a promise made? Where? Who was present? Where 
in the record is it shown? The only evidence that can be 
construed as Moe Shillington1s promise (because none other is 
alleged) is the fatally defective credit application. That was 
three to four months after Plaintiff delivered the goods. No 
CREDIT could have been extended based on reliance of Moe 
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Shillington1s signature. Therefore, there could be no reliance 
on a Shillington promise (we contest that one was made) and 
which was never intended. 
Plaintiff argues Starks v. Field, 89 P.2d 519 (Wash. 
1929) and Imperial Refineries Corp. v. Morrissey, 119 N.E. 2d 
872, (Iowa 1964) at page 13 of his brief. In Starks, Id., there 
was a quiet title action. Plaintiff cites several propositions 
but none related to our case other than in a general sense. He 
argues at p. 13 of his brief, "The pressure must be wrongful." 
Those are exactly the facts argued by Mr. Shillington. There 
were threats to Mr. Shillington and allegations that his busi-
ness would be in jeopardy over the loss of the "high roller" 
program and would be disastrous (Addendum No. 3, p. 4, para. 
18). This was unrebutted! It is ludicrous to argue this type 
of conduct was permissible and is obvious that the actions were 
wrongful. 
Plaintiff says Defendant had alternatives available but 
mentions none. Mr. Shillington was petrified to think of losing 
his business. He protested immediately to Ms. Lancaster. 
The case Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248 (Ut. 1980), is 
well known to this Court since the Honorable Christine Durham, 
now a Justice, was upheld on appeal. There, the Court, and very 
wisely so, interpreted the meaning of the word equity. We agree 
with that proposition. However, we disagree with the lower 
Court in our case as Mr. Shillington was foreclosed from a trial 
and thereby precluded from asserting any equity principals what-
soever because of the summary ruling. 
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Plaintiff also argues Mackey v. Philzona Petroleum 
Co., 93 Ariz. 87, 378 P. 906 (1963) and Diamond Fruit Growers, 
Inc. v. Goe Company, 242 Ore. 397, 409 P.2d 909 (1966). In 
Mackey, Id., the Arizona Court rejected the California case of 
Chung v. Johnston, 128 Cal.App. 2d 157, 274 P.2d 922, which 
stands for the exact opposite proposition to that quoted in the 
Yoho brief at p. 14. California, we submit is a more influen-
tial jurisdiction to our Court, would give relief against the 
conduct which is merely thoughtless and inadvertant. But our 
case is even stronger because it was Mr. Yoho who was 
thoughtless and inadvertant. It was he who had the control of 
the company and the documents and yet chose not to exert such 
control. He didn't know when the application was signed or 
when the goods were delivered. He shipped prior to any signa-
ture and didn't even know that. The Mackey Court dealt with 
reformation and recission, but did remand to allow the sellers 
their day in court. That is all we ask. The Diamond Fruit, 
Id., case is distinguished on its facts There three or four 
partnerships were transferred to a corporation to avoid obliga-
tions. The Court held it would look through the form to the 
substance and thereby pierce the corporate veil to enforce the 
contract. There was a sense of surreptitious conduct there 
which did not exist in our case. All of the cases referred to 
in our Opening Brief and the rebuttal in our Reply Brief herein 
urge strongly that the Defendant should have been given his day 
in Court and should not have been denied the opportunity to pre-
sent evidence as asserted. 
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CONCLUSION 
Initially, we agree with Plaintiff's argument entitled, 
"Point II" at p. 7 of his brief and hereby withdraw that allega-
tion of error only. 
For the arguments and cases submitted in this Reply and 
the Opening Brief we respectfully pray that the Court reverse 
the lower Court decision and remand for trial below. We urge 
this Court to recognize that there are major factual disputes to 
be decided. The lower Court did abuse its discretion and sum-
marily decided against the Defendant. The issues of intent, 
knowledge, protest, the ambiguity of a document because of the 
blanks, the failure to include a date and the failure to include 
important language should not be decided at a summary pro-
ceeding. 
Defendant respectfully requests that this Honorable 
Court remand for trial below. 
DATED this / day of November, 1988. 
Respectfully submitted, 
THORPE, NORTH & WI 
ufman 
y /or Defendant/Appellant 
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